Homomorphic Encryption Experiments on IBM's Cloud Quantum Computing
  Platform by Huang, He-Liang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
02
88
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 Ju
l 2
01
7
Performing Homomorphic Encryption Experiments on IBM’s Cloud Quantum
Computing Platform
He-Liang Huang,1, 2 You-Wei Zhao,2, 3 Tan Li,1, 2 Feng-Guang Li,1, 2 Yu-Tao
Du,1, 2 Xiang-Qun Fu,1, 2 Shuo Zhang,1, 2 Xiang Wang,1, 2 and Wan-Su Bao1, 2, ∗
1Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Henan, Zhengzhou 450000, China
2CAS Centre for Excellence and Synergetic Innovation Centre in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
3Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
(Dated: November 8, 2016)
Quantum computing has undergone rapid development in recent years. Due to the limitations
on scalability, personal quantum computers still seem a little unrealistic in near future. The first
practical quantum computer for ordinary users is likely to be on the cloud. However, the adoption
of the cloud computing is applicable only if security is ensured. Holomorphic encryption is crypto-
graphic protocol that allows computation to be performed on encrypted data without decrypting
them, which is therefore well suited for cloud computing. Here we first applied the holomorphic
encryption on IBM’s cloud quantum computer platform. Our experiments successfully implemented
the quantum algorithm for linear equations with our privacy being protected. This demonstra-
tion opens up a feasible way to the next stage of the development in cloud quantum information
technology.
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1. Inroduction
In recent years, much progress has been made in devel-
oping quantum computing technologies [1, 2]. Because of
the quantum superposition principle, quantum comput-
ers could outperform their classical counterparts when
solving certain problems. For example, Shor’s algorithm
[3–7], quantum simulation [8–11], solving linear systems
of equations [12–14], quantum machine learning [15, 16],
and so on. Therefore, the emergence of quantum comput-
ers will change the world once again. Due to its high con-
struction costs and maintenance costs, the first quantum
computer is likely to be only owned by a small number
of organizations. Fortunately, however, with the cloud
service, ordinary users can also be able to apply to use
these quantum computers.
As expected, recently IBM has made a 5-qubit quan-
tum computer publicly available over the cloud [17].
Based on a 5-qubit superconducting chip in a star ge-
ometry, and a full Clifford algebra, the system can be
reprogrammable and allowed for circuit design, simula-
tion. Through the classical internet, users can easily test
and execute the quantum algorithms on interactive plat-
form called QuantumExperience (QE). So far, several
experiments have already been reported [18–20].
The future cloud quantum computing is likely to be
available to users as the way similar to the IBM’s cloud
quantum computing platform. That is, the interaction
between users and IBM’s cloud computing platform is
achieved through the website. In this case, the quantum
circuit, input data and output data of users are complete-
ly public to the server. While sharing the computational
resources of quantum computing on the cloud, we also
need to consider the privacy. Although there are a num-
ber of protocols and experiments have been proposed to
develop the secure cloud quantum computing [21–24], but
these encryption method do not suit for the current level
of technology, since the input data or output data cannot
be public to the servers on the website in the previous
protocol.
In the world of classical cryptography, homomorphic
encryption [25–27] is scheme which allows certain oper-
ations to be performed on the encrypted data without
decryption. Thus, users can provide encrypted data to a
remote server for processing without having to reveal the
plaintext. Although the data is open to the server, but
the server cannot reveal the real data, since the data is
encrypted. After the server output the results to users,
users can recover actual output data through his privacy
key. Therefore, homomorphic encryption has become a
practical encryption technique for cloud computing.
In this paper, we designed a homomorphic encryption
protocol for the cloud quantum computing, which is suit-
able for IBM’s cloud server. Based on the basic quan-
tum gates provided by the server, we developed a series
construction methods for various operations. Finally, we
successfully implemented the quantum algorithm for lin-
ear equations on the IBM’s cloud server with our privacy
being protected. This work will hopefully motivate more
people to get involved in this field, since this is the first
time to consider the security of users data on the IB-
M’s cloud server, and can provide a guidance for future
large-scale cloud quantum computing.
2. Methods
To solve linear equations on quantum computer, we
2FIG. 1. (color online). Quantum circuit for solving system-
s of linear equations. The circuit of the original quantum
algorithm. In the circuit, U =
∑T−1
k=0 |k〉〈k| ⊗ e
iAkt0/T , H is
the Hadamard gate. FT is the Fourier transformation and
FT † is the inverse Fourier transformation. The output |x〉 is
obtained when the ancilla is detected as |1〉.
employ the quantum algorithm proposed by Harrow et
al. [12], which can provide an exponential speedup over
existing classical algorithms. Given a matrix A and a
vector ~b, we aim to solve the equations A~x = ~b. To adapt
the problem to quantum version, we rescale ~x and ~b to
||~x|| = ||~b|| = 1. Thus we can encode the problem as
A|x〉 = |b〉 (1)
Denote {|ui〉} and {λi} as the eigenbasis and eigenval-
ues of matrix A. The input state |b〉 can be expand-
ed in the eigenbasis of A as |b〉 =∑Ni=1 βi|ui〉, where
βi = 〈ui|b〉. To seek the solution |x〉 = A−1|b〉/||A−1|b〉||,
the algorithm can be decomposed into three main steps
(see Fig. 1).
In the first step, phase estimation is applied to the
transform |b〉|0〉⊗n into ∑Ni=1 βi|ui〉|λi〉, where |0〉⊗n is
the eigenvalue register of n qubits, and eigenvalues |λi〉
are stored in eigenvalue register after phase estimation.
In the second step, one needs to implement the map
|λi〉 → λi−1|λi〉 to extract the eigenvalues of A−1. By im-
plementing a controlled R(λ−1) rotation on an additional
ancilla qubit intitially in the state |0〉, we can transforms
the system to
∑N
i=1
βi|ui〉|λi〉
(√
1− C
2
λ2i
|0〉+ C
λi
|1〉
)
(2)
The final step is to implement the inverse phase es-
timation to disentangle the eigenvalue register to |0〉⊗n.
Then, we end up with
∑N
i=1
βi|ui〉
(√
1− C
2
λ2i
|0〉+ C
λi
|1〉
)
(3)
After measuring and postselecting the ancillary qubit
of |1〉, we will obtain an output state∑Ni=1 C(βi/λi)|ui〉,
which is proportional to our expected results state |x〉.
To delegate the task of solving linear equations to IB-
M’s cloud quantum computing platform, one can directly
FIG. 2. (color online). The homomorphic encryption scheme.
User encrypt the data using privacy key before sending it to
the cloud quantum server. Server do not own the privacy key
so that it cannot learn anything about the encrypted data.
If the operations of server are homomorphic operations, then
server can utilize arbitrary computations on the encrypted
data without decrypting it. The output of the server remains
in encrypted form, and can only be recovered by the user who
have the privacy key.
encode the quantum circuit on the servers without con-
sidering security. This is equivalent to send the cloud
server the matrix A and vector ~b directly. However, when
facing the issue of security, this approach becomes no
longer feasible. Inspired by the homomorphic encryption
(see Fig. 2), we can compile a homomorphic encryption
version of the algorithm.
To implement the homomorphic encryption, we must
ensure that the operations of the server and the encryp-
tion scheme of user meet the following conditions,
f(E(x)) = E(f(x)) (4)
Where f denotes the operations of the server, and E(x)
is used to denote the encryption of the message x. Ac-
cording to the conditions of homomorphic encryption, we
can design the protocol as follows:
Step 1. For a linear equation A~x = ~b with n variants,
user ranodomly chooses ai ∈ {0, 1} as private keys, and
let xi = yi + ai, then substitutes it into the linear equa-
tions
A(~yi + ~ai) = ~b (5)
User rewrite the equations as A~yi = ~b
′, where
~b′ = ~b−A~ai. Then send the A and ~b′ to cloud server.
Step 2. Server implement the quantum algorithm to
solving the equations received from user, and feedback
the results ~r to user.
Step3. User decrypts the results as
xi = ri + ai (6)
Here, we analyze the whole process of the protocol.
Step 1 can be regard as the encryption process. That
3FIG. 3. (color online). The construction of the gates for
solving the equations (9) and (10). (a) The optimised circuit
for 2× 2 system of linear equations. R is a unitary operation
that can diagonalizes the matrix A as A = R†
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
R,
where λi is the eigenvalue of A. (b) The construction of the
controlled Ry(θ). (c) The R gate in (a) can be compiled to
Hadamard gate for solving the equations (9) and (10). (d)
The construction of the Ry(θ/2) and Ry(−θ/2) in the (b).
is, for ∀~x, E(~x) = ~x′, where ~x′ is the encryption message
of ~x. Let g(~x′) and F be the linear equations and the
algorithm for solving linear equations, respectively. Then
step 2 can be represented as F (g(~x′)) → ~x′. Finally, step
3 is used to decrypt the results as D(~x′) → ~x, where D
denotes the operations of decryption, then the user can
obtained actual results. Note that with the processing of
homomorphic encryption, the input and output of user
are perfectly hidden and the server cannot get any of
the private data, since all the server does is to deal with
encrypted data.
3. Experimental Realization
Here we demonstrate a proof-of-principle experiment
of this protocol on IBM cloud quantum computing plat-
form. Using one state qubit as the two-vector |b〉, one
eigenvalue qubit and ancilla qubit, we can utilize the pro-
tocol to solving systems of 2× 2 linear equations. The
quantum circuit of the algorithm for 2× 2 linear equa-
tions can be compiled into the circuit shown as Fig. 3(a)
[13]. A unitary R is introduced to diagonalizes the matrix
A as A = R†
(
λ1 0
0 λ2
)
R, where λi is the eigenvalue of
A.R(λ−1) rotation can be realized by a controlled Ry(θ),
where Ry(θ)= exp(−iθσy/2), σy is the usual Pauli ma-
trix, and θ is controlled by the eigenvalue qubit with the
function θi = −2 arccos(λ1/λ2). The algorithm succeeds
with probability when ancilla qubit is measured in the
state |1〉. In our implementation, we choose two systems
of linear equations to be
(
0.7 0.3
0.3 0.7
)
· ~x =
(
1/
√
2 + 0.7
1/
√
2 + 0.3
)
(7)
(
1.75 0.75
0.75 1.75
)
· ~x =
(
1/
√
2+1.75
−1/√2+0.75
)
(8)
Without loss of generality, we set the private key of
user are a1 = 1, a2 = 0. By substituting xi = yi + ai into
the linear equations, user can perfectly hide his input
data, and the equations can be rewritten as
(
0.7 0.3
0.3 0.7
)
· ~y =
(
1
1
)
/
√
2 (9)
(
1.75 0.75
0.75 1.75
)
· ~y =
(
1
−1
)
/
√
2 (10)
Then user can encode the circuit on IBM’s cloud quan-
tum computing platform. For both of these two linear
equations, the R gate in the Fig. 3(a) can be compiled
into Hadamard gate (see Fig. 3(c)). Note that IBM
only provide the CNOT gate as two-qubit gate, to real-
ize the controlled Ry(θ) operation (θ is equal to −57.34◦
for both of the two linear equations), we decomposed the
controlled Ry(θ) gate into two CNOT gates, one Ry(θ/2)
and one Ry(−θ/2) gate. In our implementation, we set
the eigenvalue register as the central qubit of the IB-
M’s superconductor quantum chip. As the chip only
allows to operate CNOT gates with the central qubit
as target qubit in their star geometry. If we want to
operate CNOT gates with the central qubit as control
qubit, we need to combine a CNOT and four Hadamard
gates to achieve this task. Then the controlled Ry(θ)gate
can be compiled to the combination of several Hadamard
gates, CNOT gates, Ry(θ/2) and Ry(−θ/2) gate (see Fig.
3(b)). Now the question shifts to how to construct an R
gate, since that only Clifford gates (X,Y, Z,H, S, S†and
CNOT) and two non-Clifford gates (T and T †) are avail-
able on the platform. It turns out that adding almost
any non-Clifford gate to the Clifford gates is universal
[28]. Therefore, by adding the T gate in Clifford gates,
it is possible to reach all different points of the Bloch
sphere. Monte Carlo simulation indicates that the more
T gates in our circuit, we can cover the Bloch sphere
more densely with states we can reach. Figure 4 depicts
the attainable states by adding at most 1, 3, 5, 7 T gates
to the Clifford gates respectively.
In the Fig. 4, the red dot is the Ry(θ/2) oper-
ation we desired. Based on the results of numeri-
cal simulation, we can approximate the Ry(θ/2) gate
with the gate RS , which is the combination of seven
T gates and seven Hadamard gates (see Fig. 3(d)).
To characterize its accuracy, we compute the similarity
F = 1/2 · Tr(UidealUsimu) as 0.998, where Uideal is the
ideal unitary operation Ry(θ/2) and Usimu is the simu-
lated unitary operationRS , indicating that our simulated
4FIG. 4. (color online). (a), (b), (c) and (d) are the Bloch sphere with the dots are the attainable states of U |0〉, where U is
the operation by adding at most 1, 3, 5 and 7 T gates to the Clifford gates respectively. The red dot in (a), (b), (c) and (d) is
the Ry(θ/2) operation we desired for solving the equations (9) and (10). The purple dot in (d) is the simulated operation of
Ry(θ/2).
FIG. 5. (color online). Experimental results. (a) and (b) are
the measurement results of the output state of equations (9)
and (10). For each equations, the ideal (red bar) and experi-
mentally obtained (blue bar) expectation values of the Pauli
Z, X, and Y are presented. The error bars denote one stan-
dard deviation, deduced from propagated Poissonian counting
statistics of the raw detection events.
unitary operation is very similar to the ideal operation
Ry(θ/2). Through the red dot (Ry(θ/2) operation) and
purple dot (simulated operation RS) in Fig. 4(d), it is
more intuitive that these two dots are very close. At this
point, we can compile the full circuit for solving the two
equations on the IBM servers.
4. Results
Measuring the first qubit of the circuit in Fig. 3(a)
in Pauli Z,X, Y basis, we can obtain the solutions of
equations. Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) shows that
both the ideal (red bar) and experimentally obtained
(blue bar) expectation values for each Pauli operator
when implementing the algorithm to solve equations (9)
and (10). We compute the fidelity of output state as
F = 〈x|ρexp|x〉, where |x〉 is the ideal output state and
ρexp is the experimentally output state from the mea-
surement results of Pauli Z,X, Y . The output states have
fidelities of 0.992(1) and 0.920(7) for equations (9) and
(10) respectively, indicating a high reliable results in our
experiments.
By post-processing the results using classical com-
puter, user can easily decrypt the secret results to ob-
tain actual results as {x1 = 1.7173, x2 = 0.6967} and
{x1 = 1.7227, x2 = 0.6911} equations (7) and (8), respec-
tively. Theoretical analysis shows that the error is within
2% compared with the actual solution. Then, the proto-
col of homomorphic encryption is announced successful.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we have presented the first experimen-
tal demonstration of the homomorphic encryption proto-
col for solving linear equations on IBM’s cloud quantum
computer platform. The protocol is very suitable for the
current technology, which enables the users delegate the
task of computation by encoding the circuit on website
of the quantum servers with their data being protect-
ed. Even though current quantum computations in IB-
M’s server are proof-of-principle demonstrations, it can
be scalable for larger systems in the future. Ideally, this
work will provide a workable solution to the future cloud
quantum computation.
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